



Implications for engineering 
organisations post the Pike-River disaster 
Pons, D.J. 
 
University of Canterbury, New Zealand. Email dirk.pons@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Preprint of Article written for the New Zealand Risk Society. Citation: Pons, D.J., Implications for 
engineering organisations post the Pike-River disaster. Risk Post, 2015. 15(4): p. 15-18. 
 
While the final sequences of an accident always involve physics, the root 
causes are often in the realm of behaviour, especially the actions taken by 
managers and workers.  
 
In the case of the Pike River Mine the physical accident involved an explosion 
of methane gas, which is naturally liberated from coal. There was no shortage 
of possible ignition sources, ranging from worker violations (cell phones, 
watches), diesel engines, electrical arcing, and power electronics.  Some poor 
engineering decisions were made regarding electrical systems in particular. 
However a small methane explosion could have been survivable, but not the 
series of large explosions that actually occurred. Consequently part of the 
problem was excessive methane in the mine. In turn this was caused by the 
mismatch between the increased methane caused by accelerated coal 
extraction (made necessary by cash-flow problems), and insufficient 
withdrawal of methane by the fan ventilation system. The problems with the 
ventilation system included imprudent engineering system design (placement 
of fan inside the mine), insufficient ventilation capacity, and management 
prioritisation of production over solving ventilation problems.  
 
Fundamentally the company had insufficient funds to set up a venture of that 
complexity while still managing the risks. It is understandable that firms do not 
have perfect knowledge when they start a venture, but they also do need to 
have the courage to stop when new information becomes available that shows 
the risks to be greater than the benefits. 
 
It was not possible to secure a conviction against any board directors or 
executives of the mining company. Basically they all claimed they were not 
aware of the hazards. The law was subsequently changed to close this defence, 
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by imposing new duties. Now an organisation has a Primary duty of care to 
take care, as far as is reasonably practicable, of any people it affects: its 
workers, all the workers of any subcontractors (workers of other organisations 
that do work on the site), trainees, visitors, and the public at large. This 
responsibility extends to providing a safe work environment, having safe 
equipment and facilities, having protocols, storing materials safely, training 
workers, and monitoring the health of workers. In particular, note that the 
duty extends to all workers, whoever employs them, including those of sub-
contractors. 
 
In the past the engineering and technical staff were primarily responsible for 
the locus of action for hazard management. They were expected to apply the 
risk assessment methodology to identify hazards, rank them, and apply 
treatment. Those treatments were formulated in terms of a hierarchy of 
hazard control: eliminate, isolate, minimise. That work stream survives into the 
new Act, except that it only refers to elimination and minimisation (the 




TECHNICAL WORK STREAM: The typical organisational approach to hazards 
is based on technical staff determining the hazards, treating them, and 
assessing the outcomes. The process needs to be robust enough to detect 
when new hazards are introduced as part of treatment, and to assess the 
residual risk after treatment. Image D Pons.    
 
However a major change occurred in the additional work stream required of all 
directors and executives (‘officers’). The Duty of Due Diligence requires 
officers to make themselves informed of hazards and ensure that the 
organisation is dealing with them effectively. Ignorance of the hazards faced by 
workers is no longer a defence, but is instead an offense in its own right. Nor 
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can officers delegate the duty. Even though they can task others in the 
organisation to implement the health and safety treatments, the officers still 
retain responsibility for the outcomes. The act effectively elevates health and 
safety considerations to the same level as the strategic and fiduciary duties 
that already apply to boards.  
 
 
OFFICERS’ WORK STREAM: Directors and Executives are now required to 
keep themselves informed about hazards in their organisation, show 
ongoing commitment to reduction of harm, and apply diligence to verify the 
state of the organisation’s processes. Image D Pons.    
 
As a consequence prudent directors and executives of technology-based 
organisations will need to assess their current practices, and make changes to 
their systems to remedy deficiencies.  They will need systems to collect 
evidence-based statistics on organisational performance: actual effectiveness 
of treatments, summaries of violations, trends in safety incidents. Officers will 
need to take note of these reports, and exert personal agency to fix the issues 
and change the organisational practices and culture where necessary. 
 
Another important change is that the new Act does not preserve the category 
of ‘serious harm’. Instead the new Act defines a ‘notifiable incident’ as merely 
the exposure to serious harm, whether or not serious harm actually occurs. As 
the term suggests, such near accidents must now be notified to the Regulator, 
and can arise in penalties. In the old way of thinking a ‘near-miss’ did not have 
much consequence under law, and thus did not always encourage people to 
preventative agency. Now with the new law it would be prudent for 
organisations to learn to articulate these as ‘near-accidents’. It may require a 




Were a similar accident to occur now, the directors and executives would be 
exposed to criminal charges for neglecting their duties in multiple areas. The 
diagram illustrates some of the common weaknesses: incomplete hazard 
assessments, under-resourced treatment plans, processes that are 
overwhelmed by the number of incidents, neglect of introduced and residual 
risks, poor culture towards violations,  ad-hoc or lack of reporting of safety 
statistics to the board. These are known barriers to effective risk management 
at the engineering level. Organisations absolutely are expected to be 





NEW EXPECTATIONS: If a similar accident were to occur now, the directors 
and executives (‘Officers’)  would be guilty on multiple counts, for being 
negligent regarding their ‘duty of due diligence’ and for failing to ensure 
that the organisation met its ‘primary duty of care’. Image D Pons.    
 
However the new risk for organisations is that the Act deliberately criminalises 
deficiencies in judgement at the board level. The diagram shows the types of 
deficiencies that could result in liability under the Act. This is a new concept 
and for some organisations will require a change in attitudes and priorities of 
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directors and executives. The risk is real: the consequences are serious 
financial and criminal penalties, and the likelihood of these is high. In 
summary, organisations will need to strengthen the integrity of their risk 
management processes at engineering and operational levels, and also at 
board level.  
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